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Abstract
It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing 
that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume 
that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it 
fictional knowledge) of P*, then P* should be true—in at least a cer-
tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ-
ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to 
fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do 
not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that 
we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will 
characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of 
truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of 
the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the 
actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary 
condition for fictional knowledge accordingly.
Keywords
Truth in fiction, non-truth-conditional content in fiction, propositions, 
objectivity, dispositions.
1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in the philosophy of fiction of distinguish-
ing between true and false fictional assertions. For example, the fic-
tional assertion “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” is considered—at 
least in a certain sense—to be true, while the fictional assertion 
“Sherlock Holmes is a carpenter” is considered—at least in a certain 
sense—to be false.
The competent reader may object that Gottlob Frege (1892) 
would consider neither true nor false any sentence constituted by 
an empty name (i.e. a name without denotation in our world) and 
an expression denoting a first-level concept; he would therefore 
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judge neither true nor false both “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” 
and “Sherlock Holmes is a carpenter.” Moreover, it may be observed 
that Bertrand Russell (1905) would consider a name such as “Sher-
lock Holmes” to be used as an abbreviated description and therefore 
would judge the two sentences (“Sherlock Holmes is a detective” and 
“Sherlock Holmes is a carpenter”) equally false because the descrip-
tion associated with the name “Sherlock Holmes” is not satisfied by 
any person existing in our world. It may also be added that Kripke 
(2013: 24–5) himself excludes that fictional assertions express prop-
ositions and have truth-values.
The competent reader is obviously correct, and she may add oth-
er philosophers, claiming that the two sentences above (and simi-
lar others) cannot be distinguished either as true or false. This not-
withstanding, there has been a long tradition of philosophers who 
claimed that the two sentences above (and fictional sentences in gen-
eral) should be distinguished in truth-value (at least in a certain sense 
of truth-value).1
Let us consider why so many philosophers were so worried about 
giving truth-values and truth-conditions to fictional sentences. Let 
us consider for example the following passage from Terence Parsons
the [major] motivation [for endorsing non-existent entities] should come 
from a host of particular propositions which we believe and which seem 
to commit us to unreal objects. (Parsons 1980: 32—my emphasis)
or the following passage from David Lewis
We can truly say that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street, and that 
he liked to show off his mental powers. We cannot truly say that he was 
a devoted family man, or that he worked in close cooperation with the 
police. (Lewis 1978: 37—my emphasis)
or the following passage from Kendall Walton
What is fictionality? We understand intuitively what it is for something 
to be “true in a fictional world”: if we didn’t, criticism as we know it 
would be impossible. (Walton 1990: 36—my emphasis)
1 Among them, see: Lewis 1978, Rapaport 1978, Parsons 1980, Routley 
1980, Zalta 1983, Walton 1990, Brock 2002, Thomasson 2003, Priest 2005, 
Sainsbury 2010, Berto 2011.
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From Parsons, we may infer that we acquire beliefs through fiction 
and it is usually taken for granted that we adopt a belief attitude only 
towards what we expect to be true content. Lewis, in turn, appeals 
to what we can truly say when we talk about fiction and we usually 
say something in order to share information and knowledge. Walton 
appeals explicitly to knowledge as a crucial reason to introduce the 
notion of truth in fiction.
It seems to me that the general idea behind these observations and 
the characterization of truth-conditions for sentences concerning 
fiction is that we suppose we may acquire some kind of knowledge 
through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) and it is taken for 
granted that a necessary condition for knowledge is truth. To put it 
in schematic terms, the following necessary condition for knowledge 
is usually taken for granted:
(NCK) If S knows P, then P is true
and my hypothesis is that it is taken for granted that the knowledge 
we acquire through fiction (i.e. fictional knowledge) should satisfy a 
similar necessary condition:
(NCFK) If S fictionally knows P, then P is fictionally true
The general supposition seems to be that we acquire a specific kind 
of knowledge (fictional knowledge, let us say) when we are in con-
tact with fiction and this kind of knowledge is granted by some kind 
of truth that we may come in contact with through fiction. There 
is a well-known divergence on the way fictional truth has been de-
fended, but I suppose there is a general supposition that some kind 
of truth should be the aim of fictional beliefs and should account for 
fictional knowledge.
Now, I want to argue that fictional sentences do not express 
propositions and do not have a truth-value. My claim is in line with 
Frege’s (1982) and Kripke’s (2013) contention that fictional sentenc-
es do not express propositions and do not have truth-values.
This claim may be challenged by observing that if it is accepted that 
fictional sentences do not have truth values together with (NCFK), by 
modus tollens we have to conclude that we do not have fictional knowl-
edge, i.e. that we do not acquire knowledge through fiction. But it 
is quite evident that we acquire a certain kind of knowledge through 
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fiction and therefore the above conclusion is unacceptable. My aim in 
this paper is to claim that the objectivity of the fictional content can-
not be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions (even special kinds 
of truth-conditions), but in dispositional terms. In the last part of my 
work, I will briefly outline how a dispositional account of fictional 
content can be a necessary condition for fictional knowledge.
Let me just present how my work is organized, I will first of all 
consider how fictional truth-conditions have been characterized for 
fictional sentences (§1). Then, I will explain why two specific and par-
adigmatic ways to characterize such truth-conditions are not adequate 
(§2 and §3). In conclusion, I will explain how my different character-
ization of fictional content is connected to fictional knowledge (§4).
2 Truth and fictional truth
How to establish truth-conditions for fictional sentences? Some neo-
Meinongian philosophers have claimed that any fictional sentence has 
truth-conditions comparable to those of extensional sentences con-
cerning objects in our world; these philosophers accept literalism 
(to use Kit Fine 1982’s expression), i.e. the thesis that fictional lan-
guage has the same semantics as non-fictional language. According 
to them, as the sentence “Spike Lee is a film director” is true in Eng-
lish if the person denoted by the name “Spike Lee” has the property 
of being a film director and is false if this person does not have the 
property; “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” is true if the Meinongian 
object denoted by the name “Sherlock Holmes” instantiates or codi-
fies the property of being a detective and is false if the object does not 
instantiate or codify this property.2
The problems with this strategy are well known; among them, let 
us just mention the problem of the duplicate (raised by Saul Kripke 
2013) and the problem of logical inferences (considered by David 
Lewis 1978). The problem of the duplicate is the following: if, unbe-
known to the author of fiction, there is a person or an object having 
all the properties attributed to her or to it in the fiction, she or it will 
be the referent of the fictional names or descriptions used in fiction, 
2 See for example: Rapaport 1978, Parsons 1980, Routley 1980 and Zalta 
1983.
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contrary to the intention of the author and to the expectations of the 
consumers of the fiction.
The problem of logical inferences is that, as long as the semantics 
for fiction and non-fiction are equally extensional according to the 
proposal, combining information we gain through fiction with infor-
mation we have of our world, we may obtain unacceptable conclu-
sions. Lewis’ well-known example is that if we combine the fictional 
information that Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street with the 
actual information that there is a bank at 221b Baker Street, we have 
to conclude—contrary to our intuitions—that Sherlock Holmes 
lives in a bank.
In order to avoid these problems, it has been broadly accepted 
nowadays that fictional discourse should not be interpreted liter-
ally—but contextually instead (the terminology is again Kit Fine 
1982’s). The general idea is that whenever we use the sentence P in 
fiction, we have to interpret it as “Within the fictional context F, 
P”. In other words, the fictional sentence “P” does not have to be 
considered as literally true or false, but it should be interpreted as 
being prefixed with an intensional operator, as for example “within 
the fictional context F”, and only when considered in the range of 
the intensional operator may the sentence have a truth-value. As long 
as the fictional sentence is considered to be in the range of an inten-
sional operator, the singular terms in it cannot be taken to refer to 
objects in the actual world and therefore the problem of the dupli-
cate is avoided. Moreover, if a fictional sentence is to be interpreted 
within the scope of an intensional operator, it cannot be combined 
with sentences to be interpreted literally in order to obtain conclu-
sions about the actual world or about the fiction, so even the problem 
of logical inferences is avoided.
Now, once the fictional assertions are contextually interpreted, 
truth-conditions have been offered for sentences of the form: “With-
in the fictional context F, P”. Even though differences may be found 
in the literature on different ways to attribute truth-conditions to 
fictional sentences so interpreted, I want to consider two of them 
which I consider paradigmatically relevant—one proposed by David 
Lewis and the other proposed by Kendall Walton—and explain why 
I think they are inadequate.
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3 Lewis’s truth-conditions for fictional assertions
With some approximation, we may say that, according to David 
Lewis (1978),
(DL) “In the fiction F, P” is (nontrivially) true if and only if P is 
true in every possible-world closest to the actual one in which the 
collective beliefs of the community where the fiction originated 
are correct and in which F is told as a known fact.
I wrote that the definition I am proposing is approximate, as Lew-
is would introduce some refinements and some specifications. But 
what is relevant for my observation is quite independent of any im-
provement in the definition; it concerns the general Lewisian strat-
egy for characterizing truth-conditions for fictional sentences. In 
order to accept such truth-conditions it is presupposed that there is 
a language with certain words and rules, and a specific text in this 
language is used by the author of the fiction in the actual world and 
by well-informed speakers in any relevantly close possible-world.
The supposition of there being a language with specific rules pre-
supposed by the actual author of fiction and the informed speakers in 
the other possible worlds is challenged by the fact that some authors 
of fiction do not limit themselves to using a preexisting language, but 
modify language while creating fiction.
Among writers who actually introduce new syntactic structures 
and new linguistic expressions, James Joyce can be mentioned and, 
among the Italians, Carlo Emilio Gadda is worth remembering. If 
we read their fictional texts, we discover new expressions, new syn-
tactic structures and words used in unusual ways. These characteris-
tics do not prevent the receiver from understanding and appreciating 
what the author is presenting. But, according to Lewis’ definition, 
any sentence constituted by new expressions or new syntactic struc-
tures cannot be used in order to express something true in fiction, 
making the above truth-conditions inadequate to characterize the 
content of fictional discourse.
It may be objected to the above consideration that language is 
constantly changing even in non-fictional texts and therefore that 
new expressions, new syntactic structures and words used in unusu-
al ways are found even in journalistic reports which, by definition, 
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are not intended to be fictional.3 We may therefore wonder whether 
we need to abolish truth-conditions for these sentences as well. It is 
not my intention to call into question the truth-conditions for such 
sentences. The reason is that for these sentences, we may want to 
distinguish between literal meaning and pragmatic meaning. We 
may want to distinguish between the literal meaning of what a jour-
nalist reports and something she wants readers to understand, by 
making use of some background information shared by the author 
of non-fiction and the receivers, which allows the latter to under-
stand what the author has in mind and the particular perspective she 
adopts towards what she is reporting. So, new expressions and new 
syntactic structures simply do not allow for sentences to have truth-
conditions even if they may allow the receivers to understand what 
the author has in mind.
In the case of fiction, such a distinction between literal meaning 
and pragmatic meaning does not seem to be adequate if we adopt 
Lewis’ definition of fictional assertions: even if we distinguish be-
tween a certain kind of information given by the truth-conditions 
of a sentence and what the author wants the reader to understand 
besides this information, Lewis’ definition concerns the first aspect, 
while what is pragmatically communicated is what is relevant for fic-
tional content.
We may therefore observe that the distinction between semantic 
and pragmatic content makes sense when we consider a journalistic 
report, because we want to distinguish between what is literally ex-
pressed and the particular perspective of the author; in the case of 
fiction, such a distinction does not seem to be adequate because the 
fictional content is exhausted by what the author of fiction commu-
nicates to the reader.
The above considerations are intended to show that rules of lan-
guage independent of the actual users cannot be presupposed in or-
der to account for the objective content of a fictional assertion: an 
author of fiction may want to adopt not only consolidated language 
rules, but also a certain amount of background information shared 
by the author and receivers of fiction in order to communicate a 
certain content, and the distinction between semantic and pragmatic 
3 I am indebted for this objection to Andrea Raimondi and Aldo Frigerio.
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content, which is adopted in the case of non-fictional reports, cannot 
be adequately accounted for by Lewis’ definition. We may conclude 
that Lewis’s truth-conditions are not completely adequate in order 
to characterize fictional content if we acknowledge that a fictional 
author may want to communicate not only by using a language with 
already established rules, but also by adopting new lexical and syn-
tactic structures.
4 Walton’s fictional truth-conditions
The inadequacy of the above definition for giving truth-conditions 
to fictional sentences may be used in support of a different theory of 
fictional truth-conditions: Walton’s theory. According to Walton, in 
order to establish truth-conditions for fictional sentences we should 
not consider rules of language independent of the actual users and 
see how they work in relevant worlds where the fictional text is used 
to express known facts, but we should appeal instead to “games of 
make-believe”—in a certain sense, rules of interpretation of the fic-
tional text.
The main reason Walton wants to establish fictional truth-condi-
tions for fictional sentences4 is that he wants fictionality to be objec-
tive and independent of the actual users of fiction in order to account 
for the knowledge we may acquire or fail to acquire through it.5 He 
explicitly claims that props (i.e. in the case of written fiction, fic-
tional texts) and principles of generation (or games of make-belief) 
are objective and grant fictional truth-values.
Let us consider the following passage concerning how the inde-
pendence of props from cognizers and their experiences determine 
objective truth values:
4 Walton is explicit in saying that ““truth in a fictional world” must be dis-
tinguished from “truth in the real world”” (Walton 1990: 41) and to avoid the 
temptation to consider them as “species of the same genus” (Walton 1990: 41). 
The reason for the distinction is that “truth in the real world” is the literal truth of 
certain sentences, while fictional truth is contextual, it depends on interpreting 
any fictional sentence within the scope of an intensional operator (the operator “it 
is fictional that….”) (Walton 1990: 42).
5 See for example Walton’s quotation in the introductory part of this paper.
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The role of props in generating fictional truth is enormously impor-
tant. They give fictional words and their contents a kind of objectiv-
ity, an independence from cognizers and their experiences. […] We can be 
unaware of fictional truth or mistaken about them as easily as we can 
about those aspects of the real world on which they depend. […] Fic-
tional worlds, like reality, are “out there,” to be investigated and explored if 
we choose and to the extent that we are able. To dismiss them as “figments 
of people’s imaginations” would be to insult and underestimate them. 
(Walton 1990: 42—my emphasis).
Let us, moreover, consider the following passage concerning prin-
ciples of generation:
Principles of generation, whether or not we call them rules, constitute 
conditional prescriptions about what is to be imagined in what circum-
stances. (Walton 1990: 41)
And the following concerning their independence from the actual 
users:
Briefly, a fictional truth consists in there being a prescription or man-
date in some context to imagine something. Fictional propositions are 
propositions that are to be imagined—whether or not they are in fact imag-
ined. […] A proposition is fictional, let’s say, if it is to be imagined (in 
the relevant context), should the question arise, it being understood that 
often the question shouldn’t arise. In normal cases the qualification can 
be understood thus: If p is fictional, then should one be forced to choose 
between imagining p and imagining not-p, one is to do the former. 
(Walton 1990: 39–40—my emphasis)
The truth-conditions for a fictional assertion are therefore presented 
by Walton in the following way:
(KW) An assertion of “P” is true in a certain fiction if and only 
if there is an authorized game of make-belief for that fiction such 
that the assertion of P is true in that game.6
My concern is with the assumption that the principles of generation 
(or principles of make-believe) determine a certain rule imposed on 
the actual users of the fiction. The idea that the principles of genera-
tion determine what is truth in fiction does not seem to allow for 
6 See Walton (1990: 399): “What makes Sally’s assertion true, I suggest, is 
simply the fact that it is fictional in her (authorized) game that she speaks truly”
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the fact that certain fictional texts are jointly considered by different 
communities in different ways. For example, according to certain 
critical studies, tales of chivalry were considered in the Middle Ages 
and at the beginning of the Renaissance as stories with a hidden, 
religious meaning, later on they were simply read as the adventurous 
stories of heroic knights at the courtly service of the women they 
loved and more recently (after Cervantes) as rather grotesque stories 
of knights unaware of what they were doing.
From these considerations, it follows that we cannot expect fic-
tional texts to come with rules of generation that dictate how to in-
terpret them, should the relevant question arise, because historically 
different interpretations of what is true in fiction may be given.
Walton’s supporter may reply to my considerations by saying that 
according to Walton any principle of generation depends on the ac-
tual dispositions of the actual users in a specific context, let us con-
sider for example the following passage:
what principles of generation there are depends on which ones people 
accept in various contexts. The principles that are in force are those that 
are understood, at least implicitly, to be in force. (Walton 1990: 38)
Walton’s supporter may therefore claim that, in different contexts, 
what is implicitly acknowledged by people to be fictional may vary 
and therefore fictional truth may vary from context to context. But 
this consideration, far from supporting Walton’s theory, seems to 
call into question the previous definition of objectivity in truth, in-
terpreted as independence of truth from the actual users.
Walton wants fictional truths to be, on the one hand, “out there”, 
to be discovered if we want and if we are able to, and on the other 
hand, dependent on the actual dispositions of the users (what the 
actual users would recognize, should the relevant question arise, in 
a specific context).
There is a tension in Walton’s definition between two notions of 
objective fictional truth: (i) according to one of them, fictional truth 
is independent of the users, who may be unable to discover it, and, (ii) 
according to the other, fictional truth is—at least implicitly—de-
pendent on the dispositions of the actual users. I propose that fictional 
truth, interpreted as independence from the users and their abilities, 
should be abandoned and, with it, the notion of truth for fiction. The 
265Fictional Content
reason is that the notion of truth is historically connected with rules 
of language or rules of interpretation of language which are indepen-
dent of the actual users.
I believe instead that objectivity of the content transmitted 
through fiction cannot be called into question and, in order to char-
acterize this notion, more attention should be given to the actual dis-
positions of receivers of fiction in order to characterize an objective 
fictional content: I am going to make this proposal in the following 
section.
5 Knowledge in fiction
Let me try to sum up what I have been trying to do until now. On 
the one side, I presented my hypothesis according to which fictional 
sentences have been attributed truth values and truth-conditions in 
order to account for fictional knowledge (i.e. the knowledge we ac-
quire through fiction). On the other side I claimed that truth-con-
ditions for fictional sentences are usually characterized in terms of 
rules of language or rules of interpretation of the fiction that are 
independent of the actual users, but I have argued that fictional con-
tent cannot be coherently characterized independently of the actual 
language use and dispositions of the users and therefore the notion of 
truth seems to be inadequate for fiction.
Now, I want to consider a way to characterize fictional content 
(i.e. the content of fictional assertions) in an objective way, without 
claiming that fictional sentences have truth values or truth-condi-
tions (i.e. without claiming that the content can be characterized 
independently of the actual users of fiction). And once fictional con-
tent is so characterized, I will propose to specifying a necessary con-
dition for fictional knowledge in terms of it.
Let us start to consider fictional content. I propose to charac-
terize the objectivity of fictional content in dispositional terms, but 
my characterization of the role of dispositions is quite different from 
Walton’s appeal to them. According to Walton, given a fictional text 
and a certain context, there is an—at least implicit—disposition of 
its receivers to recognize what they are forced to imagine. This is 
an optimistic and unrealistic assumption. In order to acknowledge 
this fact, it may be useful to consider fictional texts with incoherent 
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descriptions (for example, something of the form “P and not P”), 
or with reports of indeterminate identity or vague existence. With 
such kinds of texts, receivers may be unable to figure out what they 
are invited to imagine, or even if they may claim to be able to do so, 
a closer examination of their imaginings may show that they adopt 
incompatible ones.
Consider for example a fictional description of indeterminate 
identity: if we distribute it among philosophers (a small group of 
potential readers), we may discover that some (maybe most) of them 
judge it unintelligible, others would claim that it is intelligible re-
quiring the refusal of the truth of indiscernibility of identicals, some 
others would claim that it is intelligible and does not require the 
discussion of indiscernibility of identicals.7 It may be deduced that 
the assumption that, given a fictional text and a context, there is a 
disposition to recognize what one is forced to imagine is therefore to 
be abandoned.
Instead of saying—as Walton proposes—that, given a fictional 
text and a certain context, there is a disposition to establish what is 
to be imagined, I propose that it is when there is a common disposition 
among people in a certain context to establish what is to be imag-
ined according to a certain fictional text, that the fictional text has a 
content and the content is objective. The difference can be expressed 
in the following way: while Walton claims that there are objective 
contextual factors determining the dispositions people have, I main-
tain instead that contextual factors alone cannot determine implicit 
dispositions, because in some contexts different people may have dif-
ferent reactions without there being any reason to suppose that the 
context allows for one and not the other.
The objectivity of fictional content—according to my proposal—
is not to be interpreted as a rule of interpretation determined by the 
context for the receivers, it is instead when the receivers have a com-
mon disposition to attribute a common content to a certain fictional 
text that the fictional text has a shared content and its objectivity 
7 For example, in order to account for indeterminate identity some philoso-
phers accept that the indiscernibility of identicals is not perfectly true, without 
being completely false (e.g. Parsons and Woodruff 1995: 181); others claim that 
discussing the indiscernibility of identicals is the last resort of the defender of 
ontic indeterminate identity (e.g. Lowe 1994: 113).
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does not depend on rules existing independently of the actual users 
but is, instead, determined by the disposition to acknowledge a cer-
tain content shared by both author and receivers.
It may be interesting to consider what allows for an objective fic-
tional content to be shared by the receivers of a particular fiction, 
because I deny that an objective context determines their disposition 
to share content. According to my proposal, on certain occasions 
people may share an objective fictional content when confronted 
with a certain fiction, in others they don’t. So, the problem may be 
posed in the following way: how can it happen that a fictional content 
is objectively shared by a group of people?
I propose to characterize the objective fictional content in terms 
of a common disposition of the people involved. People actually 
share an objective fictional content when they are disposed to ac-
knowledge certain situations (i.e. fragments of possible worlds) as 
adequately described by the fiction itself. The objectivity of the fic-
tional content is therefore not determined—according to my pro-
posal—by a context determining dispositions, but by the set of pos-
sible situations which a group of people is disposed to acknowledge 
as adequately described by the fiction. It is the existence of this set 
of possible situations (i.e. fragments of possible worlds) which grants 
the objectivity of fictional content.
Now that the objective fictional content has been characterized in 
dispositional terms, it is worth considering how fictional knowledge 
can be accounted for in terms of such fictional content.
Let me first reconsider the hypothesis I offered according to 
which it has been taken for granted that some kind of truth is a neces-
sary condition for fictional knowledge, i.e. it has been assumed that 
(NCFK) If S fictionally knows that P, then P is fictionally true
As long as I claim that there cannot be a truth-value for fictional 
sentences, if we accept (NCFK), we have to conclude that we cannot 
have fictional knowledge. I do not accept this conclusion. I propose 
instead to abandon (NCFK) but to adopt its spirit. (NCFK) assumes 
that a necessary condition for fictional knowledge is the objectivity 
of the content in terms of truth. My claim is that a necessary con-
dition for fictional knowledge is a different characterization of the 
objectivity of the content in dispositional terms.
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In particular, according to my proposal, a necessary condition 
for fictional knowledge is that a common content be shared by both 
author and some receivers adopting a common disposition. My pro-
posal is therefore the following one:
(FK) If S fictionally knows that P, then there is a common fic-
tional content P attributed by a group of people including S to a 
certain fiction.8
Elisa Paganini
Department of Philosophy “Piero Martinetti”
University of Milan
Via Festa del Perdono 7
20122 Milan, Italy
elisa.paganini@unimi.it
References
Berto, Francesco. 2011. Modal Meinongianism and fiction: the best of three 
worlds. Philosophical Studies 152: 313–34.
Brock, Stuart. 2002. Fictionalism about fictional characters. Noûs 36(1): 1–21.
Fine, Kit. 1982. The problem of non-existents, I: internalism. Topoi 1: 97–140.
Frege, Gottlob. 1892. On Sinn and Bedeutung. In The Frege Reader, ed. by Michael 
Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 151–171.
Kripke, Saul. 2013. Reference and Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, David. 1978. Truth in fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37–46; 
reprinted in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 261–75.
Lowe, Jonathan E. 1994. Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy. Analysis 
54(2): 110–14.
8 I presented some of the ideas developed in this work at the conference “III 
Blasco Disputatio: Singular Terms in Fiction” in Valencia: I thank Jordi Valor 
and Josep E. Corbì for organizing the conference and for inviting me to submit 
my paper to the Disputatio special issue, and I am grateful to all participants for 
the discussions. I presented some more detailed versions of this work at the SIFA 
conference in Novara and at the workshop “Philosophy of Language: Semantics 
of Fictional Discourse II” in Bratislava, I appreciated the helpful observations I 
received on both occasions. I am moreover indebted to an anonymous referee 
for insightful advice. This research was funded by the Department of Philosophy 
“Piero Martinetti” of the University of Milan under the Project “Departments of 
Excellence 2018–2022” awarded by the Ministry of Education, University and 
Research (MIUR).
269Fictional Content
Parsons, Terence; and Woodruff, Peter. 1995. Worldly indeterminacy of 
identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 171–91.
Parsons, Terence. 1980. Nonexistent Objects. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Priest, Graham. 2005. Towards Non-Being, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rapaport, William J. 1978. Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox. Noûs 
12: 153–80.
Routley, Richard. 1980. Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra: 
Australian National University.
Russell, Bertrand. 1905. On denoting. Mind 14: 479–93.
Sainsbury, R. Mark. 2010. Fiction and Fictionalism. London: Routledge.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2003. Speaking of fictional characters. Dialectica 57: 
205–23.
Walton, Kendall. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press.
Zalta, Edward N. 1983. Abstract Objects. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.
